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Abstract—Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been re-
cently one of the more popular applications in Internet tech-
nology. It benefits lower cost of equipment, operation, and
better integration with data applications than voice commu-
nications over telephone networks. However, the voice pack-
ets delivered over the Internet are not protected. The ses-
sion initiation protocol (SIP) is widely used signaling proto-
col that controls communications on the Internet, typically
using hypertext transport protocol (HTTP) digest authenti-
cation, which is vulnerable to many forms of attacks. This
paper proposes a new secure authentication and key agree-
ment scheme based on Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) named (ECDSA). Secu-
rity analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme can resist
various attacks and it can be applied to authenticate the users
with different SIP domains.
Keywords—authentication, key agreement, session initiation
protocol, VoIP.
1. Introduction
Voice over IP (VoIP) networks attract great attention since
they can provide low cost, deployment and maintenance,
flexible implementation, and new applications than con-
ventional telephones [1]. The session initiation protocol
(SIP) is an application-layer signaling protocol based on
HTTP-like request/response exchange for initiating, man-
aging and terminate voice session. Authentication is an
important security requirement when a user wants to ac-
cess the SIP services. However, the original authentication
scheme for SIP does not provide strong security, because
it works based on HTTP-digest authentication [2], which is
vulnerable to several attacks such as impersonation attacks,
oﬄine password guessing attacks and server spoofing at-
tacks etc. Therefore, with the widespread use of VoIP in
worldwide, the security of SIP has received much attention
from several studies.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. The
related work is shown in Section 2. Section 3 provides
some basic preliminaries and notations used in this pa-
per. Section 4 shows proposed scheme. Section 5 analyzes
presented solution. Section 6 shows the performance and
functionality comparisons with other related works. The
conclusion is given in Section 7.
2. Related Work
Since Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) provides a smal-
ler key size than any other cryptosystem and has faster
computations than half of other public key systems [3].
Several protocols for SIP server based on ECC have been
proposed to strength the security and performance of VoIP
communication.
In [2] Yang pointed out that HTTP digests authentication
protocol is vulnerable to oﬄine password guessing attacks,
and the spoofing attacks. They proposed a SIP authentica-
tion protocol based on Diffie-Helman key exchange proto-
col. Unfortunately Yang’s protocol still suffered from the
replay attack. In [4] the authors produced a new secure
authentication and key agreement protocol called NAKE to
solve the existing problems in the original proposal. The
scheme assumes that the communication parties must share
a common secret number k, but an adversary can easily
launch the forgery-attack to act as the server or the user
client.
In [5] Yoon et al. demonstrates that proposed SIP authen-
tication schemes are not secure against attacks such as of-
fline password guessing attack, Denning-Sacco attacks and
stolen verifier attacks. They propose a new SIP authenti-
cation scheme in a converged VoIP network based on ECC
in order to overcome security problems. However, Yoon
et al. protocol was still not suitable for different SIP do-
mains. In [6] Wang and Zhang proposed a new authen-
tication and key agreement mechanism (SAKA) based on
certificate-less public key cryptography, to conquer many
forms of attacks in SIP authentication. The proposed pro-
tocol suffers from heavy computation cost. Also, Zhang
et al. in [7] proposed an efficient authentication for SIP
using smart card based on ECC. The proposed protocol
can resist various attacks and provides efficient password
updating.
Recently Arshad and Ikram [8] proposed an authentication
protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
for SIP. However, their protocol suffered from off-line pass-
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Fig. 1. SIP architecture.
Fig. 2. SIP authentication.
word guessing attacks, for that Yel et al. in [3] adopted the
smart card to construct an authentication protocol based on
ECC for SIP. Liping et al. [9] confirm that Yel’s protocol
involved the time synchronization problem.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, the SIP architecture and SIP authentication
procedure are introduced. Then, we briefly review the fun-
damentals of ECC and digital signature logarithm on ECC
(ECDSA).
3.1. SIP Architecture
The SIP is a general purpose application layer signaling
protocol [10] that is used to create, modify and terminate
multimedia session such as VoIP calls. The SIP architec-
ture is composed of a user agent client, proxy server, redi-
rect server, register server and location server [8] (Fig. 1).
The user agent is a logical entity such as a caller or
a callee. Proxy server forwards a request and response be-
tween a caller and callee. Redirect server accepts requests
and replies to the client with a response message. Location
server maintains information on the current location of the
user agent.
3.2. SIP Authentication Procedure
SIP authentication scheme works similarly to HTTP digest
authentication [11], in which a nonce value is used in chal-
lenging the target. The response includes a checksum of
the username, password, and nonce value [6]. Here is an
example flow of authentication mechanism in SIP (Fig. 2).
1. client→ server: Request. The client sends a request
to the server.
2. server → client: Challenge(nonce, realm). Server
generates a challenge that includes a nonce and
client’s realm.
3. client → server: Response(nonce, realm, user-
name, response). The client computes the response =
F(nonce, realm, username, response). Then the client
sends the Response to the server.
4. According to the username, the server extracts the
client’s password. Then the server verifies whether
the nonce is correct. If is, the server computes
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F(nonce, username, password, realm) and use it
to make a comparison with the response. If they
match, the server authenticates the identity of the
client.
3.3. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
An elliptic curve is a cubic equation of the form: E : y2 +
axy + by = x3 + cx2 + dx + e, where a, b, c, and e are real
numbers. Let Fp denote the finite of points where p is
a large prime number and containing x, y. We focus on the
finite field of ECC, the mathematical equation of ECC to
be of form:
E : y2 = (x3 + ax + b) mod p with a, b ∈ Fp satisfying
(4a3+27b2) mod p 6= 0. The arithmetic of elliptic curve dis-
crete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is given points Q and P.
Where Q, P ∈ Fp, and compute Q = α ×P it is hard to
determine α given Q and P. In view of shortness, we omit
the details and refer to [8], [12].
A key exchange between e.g. Alice and Bob can be accom-
plished as follows:
• Alice generates a random integer a∈ Z∗p and compute
KA = a×P and sends KA to Bob.
• Bob generates a random integer b ∈ Z∗p and compute
KB = b×P and sends KB to Alice.
• Alice can compute shared key SKA = a×KB = a×b×
×P and Bob can compute shared key SKB = b×KA =
b×a×P
In this manner if we would like to find SKA = SKB, to break
this scheme, we would face ECDLP, which is a hard and
complex mathematical problem.
3.4. Digital Signature Algorithm Using Elliptic Curve
(ECDSA)
In procedure for generating signature using the ECDSA
to sign a message m an entity A with domain parameters
(E,P,n,a,b,h) and associated key pair(d,Q) the following
procedure is used:
1. select a random or pseudorandom integer k,
2. compute kP = (x1,y1) and r = x1 mod n; if r = 0 go
to step 1.
3. compute k−1 mod n,
4. compute e = h(m),
5. compute s = k−1(e + d.r) mod n; if s = 0 then go to
step 1.
6. A’s signature for the message m is (s, r).
4. Proposed Authentication Scheme
In this section, a new authenticated key agreement of pro-
tocol SIP using ECDSA is proposed. The proposed scheme
achieves mutual authentication between different SIP do-
mains, the public key is computed directly from the sig-
nature of third trust party (TTP) on the user’s identity.
The proposed scheme comprises four phases: initializa-
tion, registration, mutual authentication, and the password
change. The notations adopted through this paper are sum-
marized in Table 1. The whole process is summarized in
Table 2.
Table 1
Notations used in this paper
Notation Definition
S Server
Alice A legal user
IDA User identity
IDS SIP server identity
PWA User password
TA Trust authority
(sT ,PKT ) TA key pair
P A generator point with order n over Ep(a,b)
SK Shared session key
h(.) Secure one way hash function
|| Concatenation operation
A −→ B : M A sends a message M to B
4.1. Initialization Phase
A trusted authority (TA) was defined in each SIP domain
to issue the private keys to the entities in the same domain.
All entities have agreed upon a high elliptic curve E defined
over a finite field, which is used with a base point generator
P of prime order n. TA selects a random number sT ∈
Z∗p as his private key, and then computes his public key
PKT (PKT = sT ×P). Then TA keeps sT and publishes the
system parameters (PKT , P,n, G, h).
Each eligible server Si selects a random ki, computes Ki =
ki ×P and sends (SIDi,Ki) to TA. TA chooses a random
number t, compute x = t ×P and compute the signature
parameters (ri,si) as follows:{
ri = x mod n
si = t−1
(
h(IDi ‖ Ri)+ sT · ri
)
then compute the parameters:{
Ri = ri ×Ki
Si = si × x
Next, TA sends (Ri,Si) to the server over a secure channel,
upon receiving (Ri,Si) the server computes his secret key
Skey = Si× ki and his public key Pkey = Skey ×P.
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Table 2
Authenticated key agreement phase
Alice TA
Registration phase:
Chooses (IDA,PWA)
Select a random k and compute KA = k×P
Sends (IDA,PWA,PWA) to TA → Selects a random t and compute x = t ×P
Compute the signature parameters(rA,sA)
Compute sA = sA ×x and RA = rA ×KA
Compute :
C2 = h(PWA‖RA)
mA = sA +C2
PKA = [h(IDA‖RA).P.KA +PKT .RA]
smartcard (RA,mA,PKA)
Input (IDA,PWA)
Compute sA = mA −c2
skA = sA ×k
check if (sA ×P) =?PKA if yes
mnewA = mA ×k
Alice SIP server
Mutual authentication phase:
Input (IDA,PWA)
Compute sA = mA −c2
Check if (sA ×P) =?PKA
Select a random a and compute TA = a×P
Sends (IDA,RA,KA,TA)
Generate a random b
Compute Ts = b×P
Compute PKA
Obtain the shared key:
SKs = b×PKA +Ss ×TA
C2 = h(SKs)
Auths = h(nonce‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c2)
Send CHALLENGE 〈Rs,Ts,Auths,realm〉
Compute PKs = [h(IDs‖Rs).P.Ks +PKT .Rs]
SKA = a.PKs + skA.TA
c3 = h(SKA)
Auths =?h(nonce‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c3)
AuthA = h(nonce+1‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c3)
Send RESPONSE 〈nonce,realm,AuthA〉
Verify AuthA = h(nonce+1‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c2)
Shared key:
SKA = a×Ts = a×b×P SKs = b×TA = b×a×P
4.2. Registration Phase
When a new user (Alice) wants to register with the server S,
it performs the following process with TA to complete the
registration process:
• Step R1. Alice first selects her identity IDA, password
PWA, and a random number k. Next, computes KA =
k×P. Then, Alice sends {IDA,PWA,KA} to TA over
a secure channel.
• Step R2. After receiving the information, TA gen-
erates a random value t and computes x = t.P, the
signature parameters (rA,sA) for Alice using pre-
vious equations. Next, TA computes the following
parameters using her secret key s and the received
message from Alice: sA = sA × x, RA = rA × KA,
c1 = h(PWA ‖ RA), mA = sA + c1. Now the public
key of Alice (PKA) with the following equation:
PKA = [h(IDA‖RA).P.KA + PKT .RA].
In the end, TA personalizes a smart card with the
secret parameters (mA,RA,PKA,KA) and delivers it
to Alice through a secure channel.
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• Step R3. Upon receiving the smart card, Alice in-
puts (IDA,PWA,k) and the smart card computes sA =
mA − c1 and sA = sA.k. Next, check if (sA × P) is
equal to PKA. If yes, the smart card update mA to
the new value mnewi = mi × k and terminate the reg-
istration phase.
4.3. Mutual Authentication Phase
Assume that Alice wants to communicate with the remote
SIP server she must enter her user name IDA and her pass-
word PWA.
During the authentication process, Alice and the SIP
server S perform the following steps to achieve mutual au-
thentication and key negotiation.
Step 1 – Alice → server: Request 〈IDA,RA,TA〉
First, Alice inputs her identity IDA and password, then ran-
domly chooses a number a ∈ Z∗p for computing TA = a×P,
after that, she sends the request 〈IDA,RA,TA〉 to the server
S over a public channel.
Step 2 – server → Alice: Challenge 〈Rs,Ts,Auths,realm〉.
The server receives the REQUEST 〈IDA,RA,TA〉 mes-
sage and performs the following operations to challenge
Alice:
• generate a random value b and compute Ts = b×P,
• using received parameters IDA,RA compute the pub-
lic key PKA of Alice PKA = [h(IDA‖RA).P.KA +
PKT .RA],
• obtain the shared session key SKs = b.P+ Ss.TA,
• calculate c2 = h(SKs),
• generate the authentication information Auths =
h(nonce‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c2). After that, the
server sends the Challenge 〈Rs,Ts,Auths,realm〉 mes-
sage to Alice.
Step 3 – Upon receiving the Challenge message, Alice
computes the public key of the server and session key with
the equations:
PKs = [h(IDs‖Rs).P.Ks + PKT .Rs],
SKA = a.PKs + S.TA.
Then, check the validity of the received message Auths with
the computed value h(nonce‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c3).
Step 4 – Alice → server: Response 〈nonce,realm,AuthA〉.
After the server authentication phase, Alice computes
c3 = h(SKA) and calculates the response value AuthA =
h(nonce‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c2‖c3). Then send Re-
sponse message 〈nonce,realm,AuthA〉 to the server.
Step 5 – After receiving the message Response 〈nonce,
realm,AuthA〉, the SIP server S checks whether
the following equation holds AuthA = h(nonce +
1‖realm‖IDA‖IDs‖TA‖Ts‖c2). If yes, the server S as-
sures the legality of Alice. Otherwise, it stops the authen-
tication process.
After finishing mutual authentication between the server S
and Alice, both of them can compute session key with the
following equations:
SKA = a×Ts = a×b×P.
SKs = b×TA = b×a×P.
4.4. Password Changing Phase
During the password changing phase, Alice can change
her PWA freely and securely, without any interaction with
TA. The smart card can change password itself after
performing the following steps:
Step 1. Alice inputs the original IDA and PWA, to the
smart card and computes sA = mi − h(PWA‖KA)
check whether (sA ×P) is equal to PKA stored in
the smart card. If not, the request is rejected.
Step 2. Alice enter PW newA to compute m
new
A = sA +
h(PW newA ‖KA) after that, the password is updated
successfully.
5. Discussion
In this section, we evaluate a security and performance
analysis of proposed SIP authentication scheme. The eval-
uation is divided into two parts: security analysis and com-
parison with other related approaches in terms of function-
ality and computational cost.
5.1. Security Analysis
Replay attack. Suppose an attacker Bob replays a re-
quest message (IDA,RA,K∗A,T
∗
A ) and response message
(none∗,realm,Auth∗A) to impersonate Alice. In the pro-
posed scheme, the SIP server will detect this replay and
believe Bob to be illegal, this is because Bob cannot con-
struct a valid Auths.
Oﬄine password guessing attack. In proposed scheme,
the password is stored in the smart card, thus, an adversary
is unable to guess the password in the transmitting SIP
message.
Mutual authentication. The user (Alice) and the SIP
server can verify the identity of each other via AuthA and
Auths. Therefore, the proposed scheme achieves mutual
authentication between the user and the server.
Man in the middle attack. An adversary Bob cannot
launch the man in the middle attack to fraud the server
or user client. Because he needs to pass the verification
Table 3
Computational comparison with others protocols
11] [2] [4] [5] [14] [3] [9]
Proposed
scheme
Exponentiation 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECC computation 0 0 4 4 6 12 8 12
Hash function 1 8 6 5 7 13 11 8
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Table 4
Comparison of the security properties of different schemes
Security attacks [11] [2] [4] [5] [14] [3] [9] Proposed scheme
Mutual authentication NP P P P P P P P
Perfect forward secrecy NP NP NP P P NP P P
No password or verifier table NP NP P P P NP P P
Password guessing attack IS IS IS S S S S S
Stolen verifier attack IS IS IS S S S S S
Data integrity NP NP NP NP NP NP NP P
Efficient password change NP NP NP NP NP NP P P
Signaling attacks IS IS IS IS IS IS IS S
Suitable for different SIP domains No No No No No No No Yes
P – provided, NP – not provided, S – secure, IS– insecure
process of the server SIP and to construct a valid session
key SK. to generate a session key Bob needs to extract a
or b, he faced the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
Stolen verifier attack. An adversary cannot impersonate
the user to cheat the SIP server by using stolen information
because in this approach there is no password or verification
table stored in the SIP server. Consequently, it can resist
the stolen verifier attack.
Insider attacks. The proposed scheme process can resist
insider attacks, as the SIP server side does not need to
store the user password or verifier table, on another side, the
private key is chosen by the client, thus cannot be computed
or leaked by an insider.
Forward secrecy. Assume that an adversary Bob attempts
to find the session key Alice’s SKA = a.PKs + skA.TA. He
cannot extract the integer “a” because it is protected by
elliptic curve logarithm discrete problem. Thus Bob cannot
construct the session key. The forward secrecy is provided.
Data integrity. The shared secret key is obtained during
the mutual authentication process. The server can check if
the data received from the Alice is correct or not and the
same thing for Alice. Therefore, proposed scheme support-
ing data integrity.
5.2. Performance Comparison
The computation costs of the proposed scheme and previ-
ously reported schemes are shown in the Table 3. In gen-
eral, an 160 bit ECC could offer approximately the same
level of security as RSA with 1024 bit key. We divide the
computation cost of our scheme into three parts including
registration phase, mutual authentication phase, and session
key agreement phase. In registration phase, our approach
requires two scalar multiplications of elliptic curve. In mu-
tual authentication phase, it needs six scalar multiplications
of elliptic curve, two additions of elliptic curve and eight
hashing operations. In session key agreement phase, our
scheme requires two scalar multiplications of elliptic curve.
The total computation cost is 10Tm + 2Ta + 8Th.
As shown in Table 3, the approaches no. 2, 3 and 4 reduce
the computation cost significantly, but their protocols have
some security weakness. The functionality comparison
between our scheme and others related scheme is reported
in Table 4. Screamingly obvious, proposed scheme can not
only solve the security weakness of SIP server, also it is
more suitable for different SIP domains.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a new authentication and key agree-
ment mechanism using Digital Signature Algorithm Based
on ECC, which achieves mutual authentication and key ne-
gotiation. Furthermore, the proposed scheme could resist
several attacks, such as insider attacks, off-line password
guessing attacks, stolen verifier attacks and replay attack.
Proposed scheme shows that the corrupted TA cannot ob-
tain the long-term private keys of user clients and the reg-
istered servers to launch the forgery attack. Moreover, the
proposed authentication protocol is more suitable to au-
thenticate users with different SIP domains.
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